Among Turkey's major bilateral relationships, those with Russia are probably the most complex. There are four, often non-complementary, dimensions to Turkish-Russian ties. Ankara simultaneously sees Russia as a significant security threat; a rival for political influence in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and elsewhere in the region; an important trading partner and market for Turkish construction companies; and a crucial source of energy. These four dimensions overlap, clouding Turkey's view of bilateral ties, with one element or the other dominant at different times and for different Turkish constituencies. Leading analysts differ over how best to characterize contemporary Turkish-Russian relations. One of Europe's leading Turkey scholars, Heinz Kramer, describes it as a "cold peace;" one of Turkey's leading Russia scholars, Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, describes it more optimistically as "virtual rapprochement."

This complexity is a post-Cold War phenomenon. During the Cold War and even in the first years after it, Turkey saw Russia, almost without differentiation, as an enemy and a threat. The blossoming of economic ties; the easing of bilateral conflicts over CFE, Kurds and Chechens, and the Straits; and the reassuringly poor performance of the Russian military in the 1994-96 war in Chechnya softened Turkey's attitude, however. Turkish-Russian relations have not settled into a stable post-Cold War pattern yet, and Turks remain suspicious of Russian intentions. Nevertheless, in a post-Cold War world that has seen numerous examples of "return to history," Turkey and Russia--whose imperial forebears fought over a dozen wars--have forged hopes for manageable relations. Indeed, defying the odds of history, there has even emerged in Turkey a pro-Russia lobby of sorts, consisting of businessmen who do business in Russia and are highly influential in the Motherland Party of Mesut Yilmaz, a former prime minister and now Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey.

Probably acting at the behest of his pro-Russian supporters, Yilmaz was the driving force behind a controversial project that is emerging as the centerpiece of Turkish-Russian relations: the so-called "Blue Stream" project, a trans-Black Sea pipeline that would deliver some 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year of natural gas to Turkey. Turkish decisionmaking on this project, which, if realized, would probably render Turkey energy-dependent on Russia for years to come, was shaped by urgent national energy needs, as well as the pecuniary motives of Turkish businessmen centered in Yilmaz's party. However, it is also justifiable in wider strategic terms, and it is unlikely that it would have progressed as far as it has without the acquiescence of Turkey's military-dominated security establishment, which presumably views the matter strictly from a strategic viewpoint. There is still some possibility that Blue Stream could be derailed by technical infeasibility or by an ongoing corruption scandal plaguing Turkey's energy ministry, which has spearheaded the project.

Security
Turkey sees Russia as considerably weaker than it was during the Cold War but nevertheless as the strongest (and only nuclear-capable) power in Turkey's region and far stronger than Turkey itself. Less intimidated by Moscow than it was during the Cold War, Turkey is still loath to confront Russia directly. A recent regional threat assessment prepared in the Turkish War Academy was surprisingly mild regarding Russia. Taking into account Russia's "important economic, social and political internal problems," it noted simply that "uncertainties in Russian foreign policy need to be closely monitored."

Turkey provides military training and other assistance to Azerbaijan and Georgia. Yet it would not risk military confrontation with Russia in defense of either of these states. Rather than antagonize Moscow, and under US prodding, Turkey accepted increased CFE ceilings for Russian troops and armor in the Russian Caucasus in 1999 (Ankara remains discomfited, however, by Russia's ongoing troop presence in and arms transfers to Armenia, as well as its failure to meet even the enhanced CFE limits).

Whereas Ankara strongly criticized Russian actions in the first Chechnya war of 1994-96, it has been far more restrained during the more recent conflict, notwithstanding the considerable sympathy the Chechen cause evokes in Turkey, particularly among the tens of thousands of Chechen-origin citizens there. While raising humanitarian concerns, Prime Minister Ecevit has publicly acknowledged that the Chechen war is a Russian "internal affair." There are several reasons for the greater Turkish restraint. Most important and obvious is realpolitik. Ankara wants to avoid unduly antagonizing Moscow, which suspected Turkey of aiding the Chechen fighters during the fighting in 1994-96. Likewise, Turkey generally looks askance at any breakaway movement anywhere, given its preoccupation with its own territorial integrity. Moreover, Turkish restraint regarding Chechen rebels is a disincentive to Russian support for Kurdish rebels in Turkey. During Ecevit's November 1999 visit to Moscow, Turkey and Russia signed an anti-terrorism agreement, in which each side pledged not to harbor terrorist opponents (read: Chechens and Kurds) of the other's regime.

But there are other reasons for Turkish restraint on the Chechnya issue that suggest a newly perceived commonality of interests with Russia on Ankara's part. The aforementioned War Academy report acknowledges that the Chechen conflict "worries us with the possibility of a spillover into the region." Although unstated in the report, this worry probably focuses on the Islamic fundamentalist dimension of the current phase of the Chechen struggle. Many critics charge that Russia has exaggerated the Islamist threat in Chechnya, but no issue is more sensitive for the secular Turkish establishment than fundamentalism. Further, some Turkish officials privately express concern that a Russian defeat in Chechnya could inspire other breakaway movements in the Russian Federation, leading to its unraveling and ensuing regional chaos. Turkey prefers a Russia that is relatively weak but also one that is intact.

Political Rivalry
Turkey is Russia's main competitor for political influence in the Turkic-language states of the former Soviet Union as well as Georgia. Initiated by Turkey, six Turkic Summits have been held since 1992. The summits generally avoid sensitive political issues despite Turkey's initial effort to guide them in that direction.

Turkey and Russia also often find themselves at odds on various regional issues, both inside and outside the former Soviet Union. On the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, for example, Turkey is Azerbaijan's strongest backer, while Russia is Armenia's. In the Balkans, Turkey strongly backed the Bosnians and Kosovars, while Russia backed the Serbs. Ankara also sees Russia as sympathetic to the Greek Cypriots, based on Moscow's efforts to sell them S-300 anti-aircraft missiles and the presence of considerable Russian off-shore banking activity in Cyprus. Russia is also perceived as close to Iran, Turkey's ideological foe. At one time, Turks spoke frequently of an "Orthodox alliance"--consisting of Greece, Serbia, Russia, and Armenia, with Iran and Syria sometimes cited as fellow travelers--seeking to encircle Turkey. That type of accusation has become less common, however, as Turkish-Russian relations have improved in recent years.

The arena of most intense Turkish-Russian competition concerns oil and gas pipeline routes for transporting the energy resources of the Caspian Sea. Backed by the United States and its concept of an "East-West energy corridor," Turkey has advocated a pipeline that would carry Azerbaijani Caspian Sea oil westward from Baku through Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan--the so-called Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Turkey has also supported the so-called Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP), which is projected to carry Turkmenistani gas across the Caspian and then follow the same route as Baku-Ceyhan. Russia has sought to undermine both of these projects, which would weaken Moscow's leverage over its former Soviet provinces. Russia apparently wants to monopolize the importation and distribution of Turkmenistani gas and wants a pipeline from Baku to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk to serve as the main export pipeline for Azerbaijani Caspian Sea oil.

Other areas of post-Cold War Turkish-Russian competition have eased in intensity in recent times. Compromise, facilitated by bilateral contacts, have brought Turkish and Russian positions closer regarding CFE, Turkish safety provisions in the Straits, and, as noted, the separatist threats faced by both states.

Economic Partnership
Russia has emerged as one of Turkey's most important economic partners in recent years. In fact, before its 1998 economic collapse, Russia had become the number-two consumer of Turkish goods (after Germany). Officially recorded Turkish exports to Russia reached $2 billion in 1997, with perhaps another $4-5 billion in unrecorded--so-called luggage--trade. The official figures for 1999 and 2000 were little more than a quarter of the 1997 total, and luggage trade likewise has dwindled, but overall trade volume remains high. Thanks mainly to gas purchases, Turkish imports from Russia amounted to roughly $2 billion annually from 1995 to 1999; in 2000, with gas prices soaring, the figure surpassed $3.5 billion. Turkish investment in Russia, mainly by the construction sector, remains significant; estimates vary between $6 billion and $12 billion. Economic relations with Russia mainly reflect economic interest, of course. At the same time, it has contributed to a growing sense of economic interdependence, which has eased somewhat Turkey's security concerns about Russia.

It is doubtful that Russian imports of Turkish goods will reach pre-1998 levels anytime soon. Nevertheless, Turkey and Russia are likely to remain important trading partners for the foreseeable future.

Strategic Energy Resources
Of all the bilateral economic projects, none has wider implications--nor is more controversial in Turkey--than Blue Stream. Already the major component of Turkish imports from Russia consists of natural gas. In fact, Turkey is increasingly dependent on Russia for gas to meet rising domestic energy demand. For some time, Turkey has been receiving 6 bcm of natural gas annually from Russia. This arrives via a pipeline that circumscribes the western portion of the Black Sea, traversing Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria on the way to Turkey. This pipeline is being expanded and soon will carry 14 bcm of gas to Turkey. If Blue Stream is successfully completed, Turkey's annual natural gas imports from Russia will rise to 30 bcm, perhaps some 80% or more of Turkish consumption. Turkish officials say this figure would gradually decrease to approximately 35% as significant amounts of natural gas from other sources--Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, and possibly Turkmenistan--come on line.

Blue Stream critics fret that this situation will give Russia unprecedented political leverage over Turkey, and they charge that Turkish businessmen and officials, motivated by legal and illegal gains, have effectively hijacked the nation's national security interests. Proponents offer a variety of justifications. Foremost, they cite Turkey's rapidly growing energy needs and the fact that Blue Stream, if technically feasible, offers a direct and legitimate gas route without the political complications of challenging US-led sanctions (Iran, Iraq) or arranging transit (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan) from other sources. Some proponents deny that the project will give Russia leverage; a hard-currency-starved Russia, they say, would be just as dependent on Turkish payments as Turkey would be on Russian gas. Other advocates say that the timing of the project mitigates its strategic risks--that is, that Russia is likely to remain relatively weak and preoccupied with internal affairs during the period of greatest Turkish gas dependency. Some Blue Stream supporters even claim to see strategic advantage for Turkey in the project--as a means to foster Turkish-Russian economic interdependence and thus enhance regional stability, or as a "payoff" to Russia to encourage Moscow not to block Baku-Ceyhan.

Conclusion
Turkish-Russian relations are generally a post-Cold War success story. Ankara has developed an improved dialogue and an unprecedented level of economic ties with Russia, which gives both states an important stake in a peaceful, stable relationship and increases the prospect that they will pursue their political rivalry in the Caucasus and Central Asia without resort to overt hostilities. This more positive pattern of relations has not fully taken root, however. Ankara remains wary of Moscow's intentions and worries that it will regain its former strength. With memories of historical hostility never far below the surface, this newer pattern of ties must prove durable before mutual suspicions, now somewhat in abeyance, fully abate.

US National Intelligence Council